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POINT I 
A GENERAL FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
TESTIFYING APPLIES TO A PARENT IN A TERM-
INATION PROCEEDING. 
Respondent asserts in its brief (Point I, p. 7-12) 
that no general Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled 
testimony by a parent in a termination proceeding can apply 
because in such an action the Juvenile Court is considered 
solely and exclusively with the best interest of the child, 
the parent being a mere witness. This assertion is in error. 
It misses or chooses to ignore the real thrust of appellant's 
claim of a general Fifth Amendment privilege against testifying 
in a termination proceeding which is, in substance, a fanciful 
name for a forfeiture action of a fundamental constitutional 
right. If such a privilege exists and has been abridged, 
appellant's right to basic due process has been denied and 
no specific showing of prejudice or damage need be made for 
reversal of the trial court's decision. 
A parent, in a terminaton action, and against whom 
the proceeding is brought, is far more than a mere witness. 
Consider for a moment what the parent stands to lose. She 
will lose forever the companionship and love between mother 
and daughter. She will lose forever the joy and pride of 
seeing her daughter grow and develop as an individual. She 
will lose the opportunity to see her daughter marry and the 
possibility of her daughter bearing grandchildren for appellant. 
She loses the care, comfort and security that a daughter 
can provide her in her older age. She loses a physical part 
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of her being. None of these light losses indeed. To charact8! 
a parent as a mere witness is to casually discard the whole 
concept of a family. This the Juvenile Court Act does not do.l 
Section 78-3a-35, Utah Code Annotated 1953, in 
relevant portion states as follows: 
... Parents, guardians, the child's custodian, 
and the child, if old enough, shall be informed 
that they have the right to be represented by 
counsel at every stage of the proceedings. They 
have the right to employ counsel of their own 
choice; and if any of them requests an attorney 
and is found by the court to be without sufficient 
financial means to employ an attorney, counsel 
shall be appointed by the court. The court may 
appoint counsel without such request if it deems 
representation by counsel necessary to protect 
the interest of the child or of other parties. 
If the child and other parties were not repre-
sented by counsel, the court shall inform them 
at the conclusion of the proceeding that they 
have the right to appeal. (emphasis added) 
Obviously, the Juvenile Court is interested in the best welfar,l 
of the child. apparent, however, that the court! 
interests, legal, social and 1 
familial, of the other parties. Who are the other parties? 
It is equally 
must concern itself with the 
The answer is clear from the statute, they are the parents, 
guardians or child's custodians. A parent is not a mere 
witness, rather the parent is a party to the action itself. 
Given that a parent is a party to the termination 
proceeding rather than a mere witness, what is the nature of 
this other party role in a termination proceeding? It is 
appellant's position that in a terminaton p~oceeding this othe~ 
I 
party role of the parent is actually that of a defendant, for 
Fifth Amendment purposes, in the sense that the proceedi~~ ~s' 
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of a quasi-criminal nature in that the function of the fact 
finding process is to scrutinize the conduct or condition of 
the parent to determine whether or not that conduct or condition 
is wrongful from a legal or societal standpoint such that the 
wrongful conduct or condition justifies termination of the 
fundamental constitutional right to the parent-child relationship. 
After all, it is the specific wrongful conduct or condition of 
the parent which triggers the judicial inquiry. Obviously, 
it is not the conduct or condition of the child which is on 
trial. That would be ludicrous and no case has ever held that 
the conduct or condition of the child itself would provide a sole 
basis for termination. Rather, it is the specific wrongful 
conduct or condition of the parent, from both a legal and societal 
standpoint, seriously detrimental to the child, rendering the 
parent unfit or incompetant to care for the child which is 
actually on trial as the subject matter of the inquiry. That 
the best interest of the child will result is of secondary 
consideration to the initial issue of wrongful conduct 
or condition of the parent. 
An examination of the Juvenile Court Act itself 
establishes the quasi-criminal nature of the termination 
proceeding based upon the type of evidence necessary to sustain 
a decree of termination. The trial court must find that the 
wrongful conduct or condition ascribed to the parent goes 
beyond simple neglect or dependency and is such a substantial 
departure from the norm as to constitute a condition seriously 
detrimental to the child. State in the Interest of Winger, 
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558 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1976); State in the Interest of E. v. J.T., 
578 P. 2d 831 (Utah 1978). It is precisely the same wrongful 
conduct or condition on the part of a parent which from an 
evidentiary standpoint must be established by the state in 
order to sustain a decree of termination, which is set out in 
the Juvenile Court Act itself as criminal conduct. 
Section 78-3a-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953, (in 
relevant part) states as follows: 
The court shall have jurisdiction to try the 
following adults for offenes committed against 
children: 
(1) Any person eighteen years of age or over who 
induces, aids, or encourages a child to violate 
any federal, state or local law or municipal 
ordinance, or who tends to cause children to 
become or remain delinquent, or who aids, con-
tributes to or becomes responsible for the 
neglect or delinquency of any child; 
(2) Any person eighteen years or over, having a 
child in his legal custody, or in his employment, 
who wilfully abuses or ill-treats, neglects or 
abandons such child in any manner likely to cause 
the child unnecessary suffering or serious injury 
to his health or morals; ... 
Any person who commits any act described above in 
this section, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor 
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
county jail not exceeding six months or by a fine 
not exceeding $299, or by both. (emphasis added) 
A termination proceeding then is a civil statutory remedy 
available to the state for wrongful conduct or condition of 
the parent which could otherwise be prosecuted criminally 
under Section 78-3a-19. This brings the case squarely under 
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United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)land United States v. 
United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) .2 
The termination proceeding is a civil alternative 
remedy to criminal prosecution of a parent under Section 
78-3a-19, which is instituted in the best interest of the child, 
by reason of offenses committed by the parent, as described 
by wrongful conduct or condition of the parent herself. To 
this extent a termination proceeding is of a quasi-criminal 
nature for all purposes of that portion of the Fifth Amendment 
which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself. 
It is erroneous to state, as respondent has done, 
that appellant would have this court believe that children are 
simply chattels. Appellant puts forth no such position. Rather, 
appellant asserts that the broader principle enunciated in 
1Boyd, supra, ... We are also clearly of opinion that 
proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the for-
feiture of a man's property by reason of offenses committed 
by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature 
criminal ... As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures, 
incurred by the commission of offenses gainst the law are of 
this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within the 
reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the 
Fourth amendment of the Constitution, and of that portion 
of the fifth amendment which declares that no person shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness agains himself •.. 
2united States, supra, proceedings instituted for 
the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property 
by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be 
civil in form, are in their nature criminal. 
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Boyd, supra and United States Coin and Currency, supra is 
clearly and directly applicable to termination proceedings 
due to the similarity of the nature of the actions themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
A general Fifth Amendment privilege attaches to a 
parent in termination actions and appellant therefore asserts 
it is reversible error for appellant to have been compelled 
to be a witness against herself in this action. 
DATED this ~~day of April, 1979. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
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